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Abstract
Recently, cloud storage and processing have been
widely adopted. Mobile users in one family or one
team may automatically backup their photos to the
same shared cloud storage space. The powerful
face detector trained and provided by a 3rd party
may be used to retrieve the photo collection which
contains a specific group of persons from the cloud
storage server. However, the privacy of the mobile
users may be leaked to the cloud server providers.
In the meanwhile, the copyright of the face detec-
tor should be protected. Thus, in this paper, we
propose a protocol of privacy preserving face re-
trieval in the cloud for mobile users, which protects
the user photos and the face detector simultane-
ously. The cloud server only provides the resources
of storage and computing and can not learn any-
thing of the user photos and the face detector. We
test our protocol inside several families and classes.
The experimental results reveal that our protocol
can successfully retrieve the proper photos from the
cloud server and protect the user photos and the
face detector.
1 Introduction
In today’s mobile Internet era, increasing mobile users
backup their photos to the cloud storage servers. Some cloud
servers provide face retrieval service, which allows one to re-
trieve photos that contain a specific person or a group of per-
sons from all his/her photos in the own storage space of the
cloud server.
Further more, as shown in Figure 1, people in one team or
one family may share the same cloud storage space and up-
load their photos together. For example, people in one fam-
ily take photos of each other using their mobile phones for
a long time. In the traditional way, they may copy photos
in each mobile phone using a cable and manage their photos
manually. Nowadays, one can create a cloud storage space
and share it to all the family members. All the photos shot
by the family members can be stored to the shared cloud stor-
age space automatically by the cloud Apps in their mobile
phones. After that, each family member can browse photos
using the cloud Apps in a friendly way. Besides, one can
Multiple Mobile Users
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Figure 1: The typical scenario. Multiple users backup and
share their photos in their mobile phones to a cloud storage.
However, the privacy of photos is completely exposed to the
cloud.
retrieve the photos contains one or multiply specific family
members using the photo management module of the cloud
Apps, as shown in Figure 1.
The above application models are typical scenarios in to-
day’s mobile Internet era. However, although the manage-
ment of group photos is much more convenient, the privacy
of the users’ photos is completely exposed to the cloud server.
The facial features of each member in one family, the re-
lationship between members, and the school of their chil-
dren, etc. can be learned from the family photos, which can
threaten the personal and property security of the family.
In the meanwhile, the face detector used in the face re-
trieval task may be trained in a large scale of face images an-
notated by thousands of people. The copyright of the trained
parameters of the face detector should also be preserved from
the commercial provider’s perspective.
Thus, in this paper, we propose a novel protocol to pre-
serve the privacy of the cloud users’ photos and the parame-
ters of the commercial face detector simultaneously in such
mobile cloud scenarios. The face retrieval problem can be
decomposed into face detection, face recognition and face
label matching. In the face detection stage, face regions are
detected in users’ photos with rectangles. In the recognition
stage, each detected face is marked by a label of a member
in a group. Then a label vector is generated according to the
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face recognition result for each photo so as to mark who is/are
in each photo. The above is the off-line phase. In the on-line
phase, a user queries a specific face of one person or faces
of a group of person. Then, a label vector is generated for
this query and compared to each label vector corresponding
to each photo. Photos with the most similar label vector to
the query label vector are selected as the retrieval result.
Related Work. The secure face detection method is pro-
posed as Blind Vision [Avidan and Butman, 2006] for se-
curely evaluating a Viola-Jones type face detector. After that
Jin et al. accelerate secure face detector by introducing a
random base image representation [Jin et al., 2017]. A sys-
tem called Secure Computation of Face Identification (SCiFI)
[Osadchy et al., 2010] is developed for secure face recogni-
tion. This system use two cryptography tools (homomorphic
encryption and oblivious transfer) to implement a privacy pre-
serving computation of the Hamming distance between two
binary vectors. Recently, A lot of researchers have addressed
the privacy preserving computer vision problems [Shashank
et al., 2008; Upmanyu et al., 2009; Osadchy et al., 2010;
Sohn et al., 2010; Fanti et al., 2013; Chu et al., 2014;
Bost et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2016a; Jin et al., 2016b]. Most
of them leverage the cryptography tools which are not effi-
cient. The main mechanism in our protocols is to security
compute the inner product. In 2009, Wong et.al. [Wong et al.,
2009] proposed a secure kNN (k-nearest neighbor) scheme on
encrypted database, which developed a new asymmetric en-
cryption that preserves inner product. We tailor the encryp-
tion scheme to meet our scenario, and construct our privacy
preserving face retrieval application.
Our Approach. In this paper, we leverage a simple but
efficient secure inner production protocol to protect the con-
tents of user photos and the parameters of the face detector.
The cloud server only provides the resources of storage and
computing and can not learn anything of the user photos and
the face detector. The face detection stage is protected by the
secure face detection protocol using our secure inner produc-
tion protocol. The face recognition stage is running locally
in the users’ mobile phone. The photos is encrypted and up-
loaded to the shared cloud storage space together with the
corresponding label vector. The face label matching stage is
running in the on-line face retrieval phase. The query label
vector and the label vector in the cloud are compared using
our secure inner production protocol.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1 Overview
Our proposed methods are shown in Figure 2. In the face de-
tection stage, face regions are detected in users’ photos with
a rectangle. In the recognition stage, each detected face are
marked by a label of a member in a group. Then a label vector
is generated according to the face recognition result for each
photo so as to mark who is/are in each photo. The above is the
off-line phase. In the on-line phase, a user queries a specific
face of one person or faces of a group of person. Then, a label
vector is generated for this query and compared to each label
vector corresponding to each photo. Photos with the most
similar label vector to the query label vector are selected as
the retrieval result.
2.2 Security Model
We adopt the ”honest-but-curious” model for the cloud server.
It assumes that the cloud server would honestly follow the
designated protocols and procedures to fulfill its service
provider’s role, while it may analyze the information stored
and processed on the server in order to learn additional infor-
mation about its customers.
The objective of our scheme is to preserve the 3rd party
and users’ data privacy, which includes: 1). face detector
privacy; 2). detected windows privacy; 3). photos content
privacy; 4). label vectors privacy; 5). query privacy. While
photos content privacy can be achieved by encryption-before-
outsourcing schemes, this paper focuses on preserving the
data privacy due to the face detection and matching, as fol-
lows:
Detection Privacy Besides the detection result, the cloud
server should not deduce any face classifier information
from the secure face detector, and face information from
the secure detected windows.
Matching Privacy Besides the matching result, the cloud
server should not deduce any face information from the
secure label vectors and secure query.
3 Secure Face Retrieval
3.1 Secure Face Detection
Denote some finite field F that is large enough to represent
all the intermediate results. Denote byX the image that Alice
owns. A particular detection window within the imageX will
be denoted by x ∈ FL and x will be treated in vector form.
Bob owns a strong classifier of the form
H(x) = sign(
N−1∑
n=0
hn(x)), (1)
where hn(x) is a threshold function of the form
hn(x) =
{
αn x
T yn > θn
βn otherwise,
(2)
and yn ∈ FL is the hyperplane of the threshold function
hn(x). The parameters αn ∈ F, βn ∈ F and θn ∈ F of
hn(x) are determined during training; N is the number of
weak classifiers used.
As in Figure 2, step (1), the 3rd party 3P first generate the
product key according to the users US’s purchase as:
D-KeyGen(m): Given a security parameter m as the most
length of the classifiers in the face detector, output the
product key SK(M1,M2, S), where M1,M2 ∈ Rm×m
are randomly invertible matrices and S ∈ {0, 1}m is a
randomly vector.
the next, 3P send this product key to US via secure channel.
The second, 3P encrypt his classifiers in the face detec-
tor and upload to the cloud server with the detect parameter
{αi, βi, θi}i=1,··· ,n.
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Figure 2: The overall system architecture. (1) The face detector is provided by a 3rd party with a product key. (2) A user
encrypts photos with the same key as used in (1), before sending them to the cloud. (3) Our secure face detector protocol is
running in the cloud with the encrypted face detector and photos. The detected face windows are sent back to the user. (4) The
local face recognition algorithm is called to mark each photo with a label vector, which reveals who is/are in this photo using
1 for exist. (5) The photos in all the shared users are encrypted and uploaded to the cloud storage together with the encrypted
label vectors. The off-line phase is end. In the on-line phase, a user want to query photos from the cloud storage with all the
faces in the query photo. (6)(7)(8)(9) is the same as (1)(2)(3)(4). Then, the label vector of the query photo is computed. (10)
The query label vector is encrypted and uploaded to the cloud and compared to all the label vectors in the cloud using our
secure face matching protocol. (11) The corresponding encrypted corresponding photos with the top N matching label vectors
are sent back to the user. (12) The user decrypts the matching photos and obtain the final retrieval results.
E-FD(SK,Y): To encrypt the classifiers Y = y1, · · · , yn in
the face detector, 3P split each vector yi into two vectors
{y′i, y′′i } following the rule: for each yi,j ∈ yi, set y′i,j =
y′′i,j = yi,j if sj ∈ S is 1; otherwise y′i,j = 12yi,j − r and
y′′i,j =
1
2yi,j+r where r ∈ R is a random number. Then
encrypt {y′i, y′′i } with (M1,M2) into {MT1 y′i,MT2 y′′i }.
Output EY = {MT1 y′i,MT2 y′′i }i=1,··· ,n
As in Figure 2, step (2), to detect whether a detection window
is a face, US encrypt the window and upload to the cloud
server.
E-DW(SK,w): To encrypt the window w, US split vector
w into two vectors {w′, w′′} following the rule: for
each wj ∈ w, set w′j = w′j = wj if sj ∈ S is
0; otherwise w′j =
1
2wj − r′ and w′′j = 12wj + r′
where r′ ∈ R is another random number. Then encrypt
{w′, w′′}with (M1,M2) into {M−11 w′,M−12 w′′}. Out-
put EW = {M−11 w′,M−12 w′′}
After receiving the secure classifiers and secure detected win-
dow, the cloud server output the detection results as in Figure
2, step (3).
DC(EY,EW): For each secure classifier {MT1 y′i,MT2 y′′i },
the cloud server first compute
ti = (M
T
1 y
′
i)
T ·M−11 w′+(MT2 y′′i )T ·M−12 w′′ = yTi ·w
and set hi = αi if ti ≥ θi or hi = βi otherwise. At last,
the could server output H = sign(
∑n
i=1 hi) as the detection
result.
3.2 Face Recognition and Label Vector
After detect all the face in the photos, as in Figure 2, step
(4), the users US run the face recognition algorithm, i.e. SPR
[Wright et al., 2009], and form the face label vector Li ∈
{0, 1}t for each photo, which describes who is/are in each
photo. US set the label set {Li} as the index of the photo.
3.3 Secure Face Label Matching
In order to build the secure label vectors of the photo set, the
users US first generate the private key as follows:
M-KeyGen(t): Given a security parameter t as the totally
face number of the photo set, output the private key
PrK(N1, N2, T ), where S1, S2 ∈ Rt×t are randomly
invertible matrices and T ∈ {0, 1}t is a randomly vec-
tor.
As in Figure 2, step (5), US encrypt his label vectors and
upload to the cloud server.
E-LV(PrK,L): To encrypt the label vector Li in the vec-
tor set, US split each vector Li into two vectors
{L′i, L′′i } following the rule: for each Li,j ∈ Li, set
L′i,j = L
′′
i,j = Li,j if tj ∈ T is 1; otherwise
L′i,j =
1
2Li,j − u and L′′i,j = 12Li,j + u where
u ∈ R is a random number. Then encrypt {L′i, L′′i }
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Figure 3: The secure face detection. The user photo are di-
vided into detection windows, which are sent to the cloud one
by one. The detection results are shown in rectangle.
with (N1, N2) into {NT1 L′i, NT2 L′′i }. Output EL =
{NT1 L′i, NT2 L′′i }i=1,··· ,t
Next, The users US choose the standard encrypted algorithm
such as AES [Daemen and Rijmen, 2002], or other photo en-
cryption scheme such as [Jin et al., 2015], with their own
secret key, to encryption the photos, and upload to the cloud
server with the secure label vectors.
To search the photos with target faces, US first generate the
query as Q = {0, 1}t, as in Figure 2, step (9), where Qi = 1
if the i-th face is one of the target faces, then US encrypt the
query and upload it to the cloud server with the amount of
target faces λ, as in Figure 2, step (10).
E-Q(PrK,Q): To encrypt the query Q, US split vector Q
into two vectors {Q′, Q′′} following the rule: for each
Qj ∈ Q, set Q′j = Q′j = Qj if tj ∈ T is 0; oth-
erwise Q′j =
1
2Qj − v and Q′′j = 12wj + v where
v ∈ R is another random number. Then encrypt
{Q′, Q′′} with (N1, N2) into {N−11 Q′, N−12 Q′′}. Out-
put EQ = {N−11 Q′, N−12 Q′′}
After receiving the secure index and secure query, the
cloud server output the matching result.
MAT(EL,EQ): For each secure label {NT1 L′i, NT2 L′′i }, the
cloud server first compute
reti = (N
T
1 L
′
i)
T ·N−11 Q′+(NT2 L′′i )T ·N−12 Q′′ = LTi ·Q
if reti = λ the cloud server then set the i− th photo with the
label Li as one of the matching photos.
As in Figure 2, step (11), the cloud server return the en-
cryption retrieval photos to US, then US decryption them to
get the matching photos.
4 Experiments
We convert the Viola-Jones type face detector [Viola and
Jones, 2001; Viola and Jones, 2004] to our secure face de-
tector, which is implemented by OpenCV 2.4.3. 1 package.
The face detector consists of a cascade of 22 rejectors. The
first rejector consists of 3 weak classifiers. The most compli-
cated rejector consists of 213 weak classifiers. There is a total
of 2135 weak classifiers.
In this section, we show an experiment on photos from an
authorized family, which consists of 5 family members with 4
1http://opencv.org/
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Figure 4: The local face recognition. We label the recognition
results in label vector, where 1 means that the corresponding
person is in that photo. Then, the label vector is encrypted
and sent to the cloud server.
mobile phones. We use 100 photos (20 photos for each mem-
ber) to build the dictionary. The number of total family photos
in the simulated cloud is 1000. The secure face detection re-
sults are shown in Figure 3. The local face recognition results
are shown in Figure 4. The secure face matching results are
shown in the supplementary material.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel protocol to preserve the
privacy of the users’ photos and the parameters of the com-
mercial face detector simultaneously in mobile cloud scenar-
ios. The experimental results reveal that our protocol can suc-
cessfully retrieve the proper photos from the cloud server and
protect the user photos and the face detector. One of the core
of the convolutional neural network (CNN) is inner product.
Thus, in the future work, we will extent our approach to pri-
vacy preserving deep learning framework for face retrieval.
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